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Wiesner’s unforgeable quantum money scheme is widely celebrated as the first quantum informa-
tion application. Based on the no-cloning property of quantum mechanics, this scheme allows for
the creation of credit cards used in authenticated transactions offering security guarantees impos-
sible to achieve by classical means. However, despite its central role in quantum cryptography, its
experimental implementation has remained elusive because of the lack of quantum memories and
of practical verification techniques. Here, we experimentally implement a quantum money protocol
relying on classical verification that rigorously satisfies the security condition for unforgeability. Our
system exploits polarization encoding of weak coherent states of light and operates under conditions
that ensure compatibility with state-of-the-art quantum memories. We derive working regimes for
our system using a security analysis taking into account all practical imperfections. Our results
constitute a major step towards a real-world realization of this milestone protocol.
The fundamental property of quantum mechanics at
the heart of quantum cryptography is the no-cloning the-
orem [1], which states that it is physically impossible to
clone an unknown quantum system, that is, to generate
two identical copies of the system starting from a single
copy. This property in essence prevents a malicious party
from recovering information about the system without
disturbing it, something that is always possible in the
classical world. In his seminal work [2], Wiesner used
this property to show that by encoding classical informa-
tion into conjugate quantum bases it is possible to pro-
tect the encoded information from forgery. For instance,
classical bits can be encoded using the bases {|0〉, |1〉}
and {|+〉, |−〉}, with |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2, where the
first qubit state in each basis encodes the bit 0 and the
second the bit 1. Then, Heisenberg’s uncertainty princi-
ple ensures that measuring the encoded qubit in one of
the two bases destroys any information about the encod-
ing in the other, while the no-cloning theorem ensures
that only a party knowing the basis used for the encod-
ing can unambiguously recover the encoded information
upon measurement of the qubit. This idea was subse-
quently extensively used in many quantum cryptographic
schemes [3], and in particular in the BB84 quantum key
distribution protocol [4], which has since thrived as one of
the most studied and successfully implemented quantum
information applications [5, 6].
The application that Wiesner’s original work was in-
terested in was unforgeable quantum money. The goal of
a quantum money scheme is to perform an authenticated
and efficient transaction between a client, a vendor and
a bank via the use of a prepaid credit card (private-key
money scheme) or between a client and a vendor via the
use of banknotes (public-key money scheme), with max-
imal security guarantees. More precisely, in a quantum
credit card system, a trusted bank uses a secret to preload
a certain amount of money on a credit card, namely a
device that contains encoded quantum information, and
gives it to a client who can make payments to a vendor
who has in his possession a credit card reader, namely a
device that can access the card and communicate with
the bank, which can then verify using the initial secret if
the credit card is valid and can be used for the payment.
The security guarantee is that the client cannot duplicate
the credit card or increase the amount of money associ-
ated with it. In quantum banknotes, the difference is
that the verification must be done without the help of
the bank, hence there is no private key involved in the
process.
In the classical world, money schemes are impossi-
ble with information-theoretic security and are therefore
based on computational assumptions. In the quantum
world, schemes for unforgeable quantum credit cards typ-
ically involve verification procedures with quantum com-
munication with the bank [2]. A simpler information-
theoretically secure credit card scheme using classical
communication during verification was proposed [7], and
is based on hidden matching quantum retrieval games [8,
9]; these typically involve several rounds of communica-
tion between the vendor and the bank and the use of spe-
cific entangled states, although these requirements have
been improved recently [10]. This classical verification
scheme has also been further simplified to use again the
so-called BB84 states as in the original Wiesner scheme,
additionally taking into account realistic conditions [11].
As regards to quantum banknotes, it is known that even
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2in the quantum world such schemes cannot base their se-
curity solely on the no-cloning theorem but must also use
some computational assumptions, such as knot problems
or quantum obfuscation [12–17]. This computational se-
curity is still interesting since in the classical world there
can be no notion of mathematical security for banknotes;
their security is based only on the fact that it is diffi-
cult for a counterfeiter to copy a banknote due to its
intricate coloring and hologram design. Recent exper-
imental work has shown how such quantum banknotes
can be constructed on-the-fly but also forged [18]. On
the other hand, unforgeable quantum credit card schemes
have never been implemented until now.
Here we develop and implement an on-the-fly version
of a practical unforgeable quantum money scheme for
credit card transactions for the first time (independent
work implementing a hidden matching version of quan-
tum money has appeared since in [19]). Our protocol
builds upon the work in [11] in conjunction with the tech-
niques developed in [16], and uses only BB84 states and
a single round of classical communication for the verifica-
tion. Our construction allows us to formulate conditions
for correctness and security that can be experimentally
tested. In particular, we derive conditions in scenarios
of practical interest, corresponding to quantum memo-
ries based on single emitters or on atomic ensembles [20–
22], and to implementations with weak coherent states.
In all cases, we demonstrate that these conditions are
rigorously satisfied experimentally using a practical pho-
tonic setup based on polarization encoding of weak co-
herent states of light, and we analyze operational regimes
where unforgeability is guaranteed. Our experiment in-
cludes the full procedure of credit card state generation,
readout and verification and is compatible with the fu-
ture use of quantum storage devices, hence paving the
way for the realization of quantum money transactions
with information-theoretic security impossible to achieve
in the classical world.
Results
The quantum money protocol. To describe the pro-
tocol that we have analyzed, we first define a reduced
scheme that guarantees a weak security condition, before
extending it to a larger scheme with exponentially good
security parameters. The reduced scheme is schemati-
cally shown in Fig. 1.
Let us assume that the bank prepares a prepaid credit
card state, which for now consists of a single pair of qubits
only, chosen from the following set using a random secret
classical string s :
Spair = {|0+〉, |0−〉, |1+〉, |1−〉, |+ 0〉, |+ 1〉, | − 0〉, | − 1〉},
(1)
where |0〉, |1〉 and |+〉, |−〉 are the Pauli σz and σx basis
eigenstates, respectively. The secret string s consists of
three bits, {b, c0, c1}, where b = 0 indicates that the first
qubit is encoded in the σz basis and the second in the σx
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Figure 1. Practical quantum money protocol. The se-
quence of interactions between the credit card holder (client),
the bank and the vendor involved in the transaction. In the
preparation phase, the bank uses a secret key to prepare the
quantum state loaded on the credit card, which is then given
to the client. In the transaction phase, the vendor randomly
selects one out of two challenge questions, measures the qubits
and sends the outcome to the bank, who can then verify the
validity of the credit card or detect a forgery attempt.
basis, while b = 1 indicates that the first one is encoded
in the σx basis and the second in the σz basis. c0, c1 are
the two encoded bits, with 0 corresponding to the states
|0〉, |+〉 and 1 corresponding to the states |1〉, |−〉.
When a transaction is to be made, the following in-
teractions occur: first, the client hands the credit card
to the vendor, who chooses at random one out of two
challenge questions and accesses the credit card, i.e., per-
forms a measurement on the stored qubits in order to get
an answer for the selected challenge. As a second step,
the vendor sends the classical bits corresponding to the
chosen challenge, along with the answer obtained upon
measurement, to the bank. Finally, the bank verifies the
authenticity of the credit card using the secret string s
and responds with a yes or no. If the answer of the bank
is yes then the transaction may occur, otherwise the card
is rejected and declared as a counterfeit.
The two challenge questions, Qzz and Qxx, read:
Qzz = Guess the two bits c0, c1, such that the guess cor-
responding to the qubit prepared in the σz basis is correct.
Qxx = Guess the two bits c0, c1, such that the guess cor-
responding to the qubit prepared in the σx basis is correct.
We may also define the conjunction of both challenges:
Q = Guess the two bits c0, c1.
The main idea here is that a valid credit card can al-
ways be verified in the ideal case: the vendor performs
a measurement in the σz ⊗ σz basis in order to verify
3the Qzz challenge, and in the σx ⊗ σx basis in order to
verify the Qxx challenge. In general, we denote by c the
probability of successfully answering Qzz or Qxx, and we
call this the correctness parameter. In the ideal case, c
is equal to 1 for the above challenges: measuring both
qubits in the σz basis always answers the Qzz challenge
correctly, and similarly for Qxx. In a realistic implemen-
tation, however, c might not be equal to 1 due to system
imperfections. It might also take different values, czz and
cxx, for Qzz and Qxx, respectively. In this case, c can be
calculated as the average of czz and cxx, as we describe
later.
Let us now see what happens if a dishonest client tries
to duplicate the credit card. Since the 2-qubit state is un-
known, there is no way that the two copies of the credit
card can pass both challenges with high probability. The
upper bound on this cheating probability has been de-
rived in [7, 11] and shown to be 3/4. A crucial prop-
erty of the game is that if one plays in parallel t such
games, then one can upper bound the probability a dis-
honest client can answer the challenge Q for all t games
as (3/4)t [7]. In other words, performing a general at-
tack on the composite Hilbert space of all qubit pairs in
the card cannot yield a higher cheating probability than
performing an optimal attack on each individual pair. In
general, we denote by  the probability of successfully
answering the conjunction challenge Q, i.e., the prob-
ability of successfully cheating, and we call this the se-
curity parameter materializing the non-clonability of the
quantum state. We refer to such a challenge game as a
(c,)-game G.
Starting from a (c, )-game G that consists of a single
pair of qubits and for which the following relation be-
tween the correctness and the security parameter holds,
c >
+ 1
2
, (2)
we can construct a different game G′ that consists of n
such pairs of qubits, where we denote by |$s〉 the 2n-
qubit state chosen by a randomly generated secret classi-
cal string s of length 3n. Here again, the vendor chooses
at random one out of two challenge questions and per-
forms a measurement on all 2n qubits accordingly (either
σz⊗σz on all n pairs or σx⊗σx on all n pairs). If we now
define the two challenges as: (i) answering the challenge
Qzz correctly for at least a fraction c− δ of the n pairs,
and (ii) answering the challenge Qxx for at least a frac-
tion c− δ of the n pairs, where we define (see Methods)
δ =
2c− − 1
3
> 0, (3)
then we can use the analysis in [16], based on a Chernoff
bound argument [23], and have that the correctness c′
and security ′ of the game G′ satisfy
c′ = 1− e− cn2 δ2 and ′ = e− n3 δ2 . (4)
This means that, for the game G′, the correctness pa-
rameter c′ is exponentially close to 1 and the security
parameter ′ exponentially close to zero.
Since in our initial game G we have  = 3/4, then we
can see from Eq. (2) that in any secure implementation
of the game G we need to achieve c > 7/8 = 0.875. The
more c exceeds this bound, the better security (i.e., the
lower ′) we will get for a game G′ of size n.
The above description provides a game with exponen-
tially good security parameters. By including quantum
states that correspond to many such games in the same
credit card as well as a unique classical serial number,
one can use theorems from [7, 14, 16] to extend the above
scheme into a quantum prepaid credit card scheme,
where the quantum credit card may be re-used multiple
times and a dishonest client cannot create a copy of
the credit card even if he has in his possession multiple
credit cards. Hence, satisfying Eq. (2) experimentally
is enough to implement a full quantum money scheme
with information-theoretic security given by correctness
and security parameters from Eq. (4).
Security analysis for weak coherent states. In our
discussion up till now, we have assumed that the bank
creates single-qubit states and stores them in the credit
card. In practice, this assumption would be compatible
with an implementation using either a quantum memory
based on single emitters [24, 25], which are expected to
emit true single photons to be measured by the vendor
for verification regardless of the input state used by the
bank in the card preparation stage, or a quantum mem-
ory based on atomic ensembles [26, 27] when the input
state is a true single-photon state. In the following, we
shall refer to this case as the “single-photon state” pro-
tocol. The correctness and security parameters defined
above apply to this case.
In other cases of practical interest, however, we would
like to use atomic-ensemble quantum memories and also
weak coherent states as an input, as is typically the case,
for instance, in quantum cryptographic applications [5].
In this case, the memory preserves the Poisson photon
statistics in the output state and simply introduces at-
tenuation, hence reducing the average photon number
per pulse µ that characterizes such states. The security
threshold therefore has to be modified. More specifically,
the bound that c must exceed has to be a function of µ.
In the following, we shall refer to this case as the “weak
coherent state” protocol. Our security analysis first con-
siders specific attacks that may take place in an exper-
imental implementation where the phase of each state
is not randomized, namely unambiguous state discrim-
ination (USD) attacks. As a second step, we derive a
rigorous bound that applies to all attacks in the phase
randomized case.
Starting with the non phase-randomized case, USD at-
tacks are possible only for sets of linearly independent
4states [28–30], which is the case for the set of states used
in our protocol when physically realized with weak co-
herent state encoding. A dishonest client willing to copy
the credit card can perform specific positive operator val-
ued measurements (POVM) to perfectly discriminate and
identify a fraction of the states in the card. Success-
fully identifying one state in a pair allows the successful
cloning of the whole pair, since the adversary knows that
the other state is prepared in the conjugate basis. Fol-
lowing the analysis in Refs. [29] and [30] for our set of
states, for µ ≤ 2, and assuming that no phase random-
ization is performed on our states, gives a probability for
successful USD
PD = 2e
−µ2
(
sinh
µ
2
− sin µ
2
)
. (5)
By a Chernoff bound argument [23], we then have that
for n pulses (in the 2n-qubit sequence) that are created
according to the Poisson distribution with a mean pho-
ton number µ, with very high probability the number of
pulses among these n pulses for which the USD is suc-
cessful is very close to its expectation. In other words,
if L1, ...Ln are random variables that take the value 1 if
the pulse leads to a successful USD, then we have for the
sum L =
∑
i Li that
Pr[L ≥ (1 + η)PD] ≤ e−
PDn
3 η
2
, (6)
where η > 0 is a parameter accounting for finite number
statistics that can be optimized as discussed further on.
We can now define a new parameter δ as
δ =
2c− − (1 + η)PD − 1
3
> 0, (7)
and restate the condition of Eq. (2) as
c >
+ (1 + η)PD + 1
2
, (8)
leading to the following correctness and security param-
eters that take into account possible USD attacks:
c′ = 1− e− cn2 δ2 and ′ ≤ e− n3 δ2 + e−PDn3 η2 . (9)
Note that the second term in the expression of ′ comes
from the fact that, in case L is bigger than its expecta-
tion, then the dishonest client can perfectly cheat on a
larger number of pairs.
A dishonest client may further boost his cheating prob-
ability by exploiting the losses present in a realistic im-
plementation. In the presence of losses, the client having
used USD to copy the card may indeed replace the states
that he has successfully identified with states containing
a higher average photon number µ at the input of the
card reader, in order to increase the probability of detec-
tion by the vendor, and replace the ones that he failed
to identify with vacuum states. Such a strategy will not
be detected when a state is measured in the correct ba-
sis but it will induce an increase in the number of total
clicks on the detectors registered by the card reader when
a state is measured in the conjugate basis. As was shown
in [29], in order for this cheating strategy to be detected
and thus for the protocol to be secure, the total efficiency
must fulfill the condition
ηqmηdet >
−ln(1− PD)
µ
, (10)
where ηqm is the retrieval efficiency of the quantum mem-
ory in the original valid card and ηdet is the detection
efficiency of the card reader.
Thus, for the “weak coherent state” protocol, as long
as it is possible to satisfy Eqs. (8) and (10) experimen-
tally, then a quantum credit card scheme secure against
USD attacks, characterized by correctness and security
parameters given in Eq. (9), can be implemented.
In the case where phase randomization is performed,
then each weak coherent state appears to the adversary
as a Poisson distributed mixture of Fock states [31]:
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
|√µeiφ〉〈√µeiφ|dφ = e−µ
∞∑
n=0
µn
n!
|n〉〈n| (11)
This allows us to derive a general security bound con-
sidering three distinct cases. If the state is a vacuum
state, then there is no information content. If the state
is a single-photon state, then the previous security anal-
ysis may be used against general attacks. If the state
contains 2 photons or more, then we assume that the ad-
versary may perfectly cheat. This allows us to derive a
more pessimistic yet rigorous security threshold,
c >
+ (1 + η)λ+ 1
2
, (12)
where λ = 1−(1+µ)e
−µ
1−e−µ , and
c′ = 1− e− cn2 δ2 and ′ ≤ e− n3 δ2 + e−λn3 η2 . (13)
As long as it is possible to satisfy Eq. (12) ex-
perimentally, then a quantum credit card scheme
with information-theoretic security against all at-
tacks performed on uniformly phase randomized weak
coherent states, characterized by correctness and se-
curity parameters given in Eq. (13), can be implemented.
Experimental principle and setup. In order to test
in practice the security conditions from Eqs. (2), (8) and
(10) and identify suitable operation regimes, we have im-
plemented an on-the-fly version of our quantum money
protocol in which the qubit pairs of the credit card are
sent directly to the vendor’s card reader, without inter-
mediate storage in a quantum memory. In our experi-
ment we have not performed phase randomization (this
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Figure 2. Experimental setup of the quantum money system. The credit card state preparation is performed using
pulses carved from light emitted by a telecommunication wavelength laser diode using an acousto-optic modulator (AOM).
A multi-stage polarization controller (EOSPACE) is then used to select the polarization states according to the protocol by
applying suitable voltages. The average photon number of pulse µ is set by a variable optical attenuator (VOA) and is
calibrated with a 99/1 beam splitter (BS) and a photodiode. The credit card reader is materialized by a standard polarization
analysis setup including a half-wave plate (HWP), a polarization beam splitter (PBS) and two InGaAs single-photon avalanche
photodiodes (ID201). The entire setup is synchronized using a multi-channel delay generator and is controlled by software
incorporating the random state generation and data acquisition and processing.
can be implemented subsequently in the same manner
as [32]), hence the security bound of Eq. (12) has not
been explicitly considered. The verification test consists
in measuring the correctness parameters czz for the chal-
lenge question Qzz and cxx for Qxx on blocks of n qubit
pairs, each of which is randomly chosen from the set of
Eq. (1). This is done by measuring each block in the
σz ⊗ σz basis or in the σx ⊗ σx basis, respectively. As
noted earlier, the correctness parameter is calculated as
c = (czz + cxx)/2, and must exceed the thresholds from
Eqs. (2) and (8) in order for the credit card to be val-
idated by the bank. This does not compromise the se-
curity of the implementation as it is always possible to
symmetrize the data by relabeling the bases such that in
practice the two parameters become effectively the same.
Once c has been measured, the correctness and security
of the full protocol can be estimated for the different sce-
narios from Eqs. (4) and (9).
The experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2. The qubit
pairs of the credit card state are encoded in the polar-
ization of weak coherent states of light produced with
standard optical communication components. The light
emitted at 1564 nm by a continuous-wave laser diode
is first modulated using an acousto-optic modulator to
produce pulses with a duration of 20µs and a repetition
rate of 20 kHz. A variable optical attenuator is used
to reduce the intensity of the pulses and set the aver-
age photon number per pulse µ. Then, the light pulses
go through a multi-stage polarization controller consist-
ing of an electro-optic modulator, which sets the polar-
ization of each pulse to horizontal, vertical, diagonal or
antidiagonal, according to a suitable combination of ap-
plied voltages. These polarization states correspond to
the qubit states |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 and |−〉, respectively. The
voltage sequences applied to the controller are generated
such that two successive pulses form a pair whose polar-
ization state is randomly chosen from the set Spair, as
required by our protocol.
The value of µ is fixed for each experiment at the out-
put of the polarization controller, as described in more
detail in the Methods. Finally, the pulses are directed
to the credit card reader, where the polarization state of
each pulse is measured in either the σz or the σx basis
by the combination of a half-wave plate, set at an an-
gle 0◦ or 22.5◦ with respect to the horizontal direction,
respectively, and a polarization beam splitter whose out-
puts are directed to two single-photon detectors labeled
D0/+ and D1/−. At the end of the experiment, the data
sets corresponding to the credit card state generated by
the bank, the bases selected by the vendor, and the mea-
surement outcomes obtained for the different challenge
questions are analyzed to assess the security of our im-
plementation.
Quantum money results. The experimental results
for the values of czz, cxx and c, obtained for weak co-
herent states with different values of µ ≤ 1, are shown
in Fig. 3 (green symbols). We also display the secu-
rity thresholds corresponding to Eq. (2) for the “single-
photon state” protocol (full pink line) and Eqs. (8) and
(12) for the “weak coherent state” protocol, which is plot-
ted for different values of the parameter η (dashed red
and purple lines respectively). We post-select on events
for which at least one of the detectors has clicked (see
Methods for more details on the extraction of these pa-
rameters). We have also plotted simulations of the evo-
lution of c with µ (cyan lines) according to a theoretical
model that takes into account Poisson statistics of weak
coherent states, dark count probability, finite detection
6Figure 3. Experimental results for different values of µ. Measured czz, cxx, and c values (green symbols) are plotted as
a function of the average photon number per pulse µ. Each measured block consists of a number of post-selected pairs ranging
from 1.3 × 105 for µ = 0.025 to 2.6 × 105 for µ = 0.40 and 2.0 × 105 for µ = 1. The red lines correspond to the security
threshold for the “weak coherent state” protocol encompassing USD attacks for values of η = 0.020 and η = 0.402, while the
purple line corresponds to the threshold for general attacks on phase-randomized weak coherent states, for the same values of η.
The full pink line corresponds to the security threshold for the “single-photon state” protocol. The cyan curves correspond to
theoretical simulations for weak coherent states assuming a dark count probability of 7×10−5, detection efficiency of 25%, state
purity values of p = 0.76, 0.93, 1 and post-selection of pulses with at least one detector clicking. The blue curves correspond to
the same theoretical simulations, this time for true single-photon states with an emission efficiency µ. The plotted error bars
correspond to 5σ (see Methods).
efficiency, state purity and post-selection of pulses where
at least one detector clicks (see Methods for more de-
tails). The best fit of our data points corresponds to a
state purity p = 93%. This reduced purity with respect
to the 99.5% purity obtained when all states in a block
are, for instance, σz eigenstates, is due to the large volt-
age differences that are required as an input to the po-
larization controller for different consecutive states in a
block of random states. The limited response time of the
involved electronics leads to state generation with non-
optimal purity. Note that, even though we are using an
attenuated laser in the experiment, our data also gives
us a good estimation of the performance we would obtain
with true single photons emitted with an efficiency µ. In-
deed (see Methods and Fig. 4), for our regime of param-
eters, the expected value of the correctness parameter c
for single-photon states (blue lines in Fig. 3) is extremely
close to those for weak coherent states. Thus, our exper-
imental data can be analyzed for the various input state
and quantum memory configurations considered here.
For the “weak coherent state” protocol, the security
threshold of Eq. (8), taking into account USD attacks
only, reaches 1 for µ & 1. Hence, for larger values of
µ, the protocol is insecure against USD attacks. Note
that for the threshold of Eq. (12) which ensures security
against any attack (for phase-randomized states), it can
be seen that µ must not exceed 0.40. The simulations in
secure (B>0)
maybe insecure (B<0)
B=
0
10-2 10-1 100
to
t
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Figure 4. Security regions for weak coherent states.
B = ηtot+ln(1−PD)/µ is plotted as a function of the average
number of photons per pulse µ and the total efficiency ηtot =
ηqmηdet. The security condition of Eq. (10) is fulfilled when
B > 0.
Fig. 3 also show that the protocol is insecure when the
state purity p drops below 76%, since the value of c then
falls below the USD attack security threshold. However,
for 0.01 ≤ µ < 1 and for p ≥ 0.76, there is a wide region
of parameters for which the protocol is secure against
7such attacks. Indeed, for our experimental results with
p = 0.93, the protocol is secure against USD attacks for
values of µ up to 1. In Fig. 4, we show the security regions
corresponding to Eq. (10) as a function of µ and ηtot =
ηqmηdet: our experiments, with ηqm = 1 and ηdet = 0.25,
are situated in the secure region for all values of µ ≤ 2.
For the “single-photon state” protocol, the security
threshold of Eq. (2) is constant and equal to 7/8 = 0.875
for all values of µ. Our experimental data, interpreted
as if resulting from single-photon states with a polariza-
tion purity p = 0.93 and an efficiency 0.02 ≤ µ ≤ 1,
are secure and show a value of c well above the security
threshold. We also notice that the protocol can tolerate
large attenuations even for relatively low values of purity.
The measured values for c allow us to estimate the
number n of qubit pairs required for our prepaid quan-
tum credit card scheme (corresponding to the game G′)
to reach a high level of security. In Fig. 5, we show val-
ues for the correctness and security parameters c′ and ′
defined in Eq. (4) for the “single-photon state” protocol,
using the experimental values c = 0.953±0.011 for µ = 1
(full red line), c = 0.966±0.018 for µ = 0.10 (dashed red
line) and c = 0.953±0.014 for µ = 0.025 (dotted red line).
We see that, as ′ drops quickly with the number of qubit
pairs n, a measured credit card state consisting of a num-
ber of pairs comprised between 104 and 105 is sufficient
to reach an arbitrarily small cheating probability in this
case, for a wide range of efficiencies µ ∈ [0.025; 1]. Note
that when estimating c′ and ′, we use the lowest value
for the experimental value of c taking into account error
bars of 5σ. In this way, there is a probability no higher
than 10−6 that the true c value actually lies beneath this
point.
In Fig. 5, we also display values for the correctness and
security parameters c′ and ′ defined in Eq. (9) for the
“weak coherent state” protocol, using the experimental
values c = 0.953 ± 0.011 for µ = 1 (full blue line),
c = 0.965 ± 0.010 for µ = 0.40 (mixed blue line),
c = 0.966 ± 0.018 for µ = 0.10 (dashed blue line) and
c = 0.953 ± 0.014 for µ = 0.025 (dotted blue line). The
parameter η has an opposite effect in the two terms in
the expression of ′ and we find that these two terms
must be roughly balanced. Values for η have therefore
been chosen accordingly, and we see that the optimal
values strongly depend on µ : they must be increased as
µ decreases. We also notice that, in general, states with
large values of µ require a higher number of detected
pairs than states with small values of µ in order to reach
the same security level. However, as long as µ is not too
big, the minimal number of pairs remains of the order of
105, and this effect is counter-balanced by the fact that a
higher value of µ increases the number of useful detected
pulses and hence the number n of detected pairs. Thus,
despite this trade-off, in order to optimize the perfor-
mance of the setup, it is in general preferable to keep
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Figure 5. Correctness and security parameters of the
full scheme. Numerical calculations for the correctness pa-
rameter c′ (upper graph) and security parameter ′ (lower
graph) as a function of the number n of measured qubit pairs
in the credit card, with experimental values of c = 0.953 ±
0.011 for µ = 1 (full red and blue lines), c = 0.965 ± 0.010
for µ = 0.40 (mixed blue line), c = 0.966± 0.018 for µ = 0.10
(dashed red and blue lines) and c = 0.953±0.014 for µ = 0.025
(dotted red and blue lines). Note that the lowest values of the
5σ error bars are considered for plotting these bounds. Red
lines correspond to the “single-photon state” protocol while
blue lines correspond to the “weak coherent state” protocol.
µ as high as possible in order to maximize the number
of detected pairs. We may therefore conclude that
our proof-of-principle experiment for the “weak coher-
ent state” protocol works optimally when µ ∈ [0.10; 0.40].
Discussion
The results that we have presented constitute the first
on-the-fly implementation of provably unforgeable quan-
tum money. Our implementation is based on a practical
photonic setup with requirements close to those of stan-
dard quantum key distribution systems, which is used
for quantum credit card on-the-fly generation and read-
8out. The validation of our quantum money protocol and
the chosen experimental conditions anticipate the future
use of state-of-the-art quantum storage devices, based on
single emitters or atomic ensembles, for real-world real-
ization of credit card states.
The integration of our system with a quantum mem-
ory requires further developments, in particular to en-
sure wavelength matching and synchronization, and the
full system will be mainly limited by the performance of
the quantum storage device, in particular with respect
to timing and losses. Regarding losses, we remark that
our implementation has minimal channel losses as the
transaction is performed locally, while detection losses
are processed through our post-selection procedure and
taken into account in our security analysis when practical
weak coherent states are used in the implementation.
Our work sets a complete theoretical and operational
framework for quantum money, and is fully compatible
with presently existing quantum memories. In this
sense, we provide a crucial experimental benchmark for
unforgeability of quantum money, and for any other
application where our transaction framework may be
relevant.
Methods
Derivation of δ. For the completeness of game G′, we
have that the honest client must ensure at least c− δ of
the Qxx challenges, or at least c−δ of the Qzz challenges,
are answered correctly. The correctness c′ in the first half
of Eq. (4) comes from a simple Chernoff bound, since
the client succeeds with probability c in the challenge.
In order to prove that the security parameter ′ is the
one given in the second part of Eq. (4), it suffices to
show that the cheating client has to ensure the challenge
Q is answered correctly for a fraction of at least  + δ
of the games G in order to cheat in G′. Note that the
client must be able to ensure the correct answer for at
least a fraction of c− δ of each of the two challenges and
hence the fraction of games where both challenges must
be answered is at least 2(c− δ)− 1, as illustrated below:
Making this equal to + δ provides the value of δ for the
“single-photon state” protocol:
+ δ = 2(c− δ)− 1
δ =
2c− − 1
3
(14)
For the “weak coherent state” protocol, taking into ac-
count the Poissonian nature of these states, we have that
the extra probability (1 + η)PD of successful USD per
pulse goes straight to the adversary. Equation (14) may
then be rewritten as
δ =
2c− − (1 + η)PD − 1
3
. (15)
Setting of µ. The value of µ in our experiment is defined
as the average photon number per single-photon-detector
gate at the output of the polarization controller. It can
be expressed as follows:
µ =
λ
hc
τgate
τpulse
ηPC rsplit P99mean
frep
, (16)
where λ = 1564 nm is the wavelength, h is Planck’s
constant, c is the speed of light in vacuum, τgate = 500 ps
is the duration of the detection gate of the single-photon
detectors, τpulse = 20µs is the duration of the light
pulses, frep = 20 kHz is the repetition rate of these
pulses, rsplit is the exact splitting ratio of the 99/1 beam
splitter, ηPC = 0.50 is the transmission coefficient of the
polarization controller and P99mean is the mean power
measured at the 99 output of the 99/1 beam splitter.
Extraction of czz and cxx. We estimate the values of
the correctness parameters from the experimental results
by post-selecting pulses where at least one of the single-
photon detectors clicked as follows:
czz =
1
2
(c0 + c1)
=
1
2
N|0〉(D0/+ only)
N|0〉(D0/+ orD1/−)
+
1
2
N|1〉(D1/− only)
N|1〉(D0/+ orD1/−)
, (17)
and
cxx =
1
2
(c+ + c−)
=
1
2
N|+〉(D0/+ only)
N|+〉(D0/+ orD1/−)
+
1
2
N|−〉(D1/− only)
N|−〉(D0/+ orD1/−)
, (18)
where cs is the fidelity of the state |s〉,
N|s〉(D0/+ orD1/−) is the number of pulses corre-
sponding to the state |s〉 that generated a click on
at least one of the detectors, N|s〉(D0/+ only) and
N|s〉(D1/− only) are the number of pulses corresponding
to the state |s〉 that generated a click on the detector
D0/+ but not on the detector D1/− or on D1/− but not
on D0/+, respectively, with s = 0, 1,+,−.
The parameter czz is estimated from measurements
performed in the σz basis for the entire block, i.e., with
the half-wave plate rotated to 0◦, while cxx is estimated
9from measurements performed in the σx basis for the
entire block, i.e., with the half-wave plate rotated to
22.5◦.
Statistical errors. The pulse sequences used for
measuring czz and cxx for each value of µ < 1 con-
sisted of 3 × 106 pulses (i.e., 1.5 × 106 pairs) before
post-selection. Each of the four polarization states was
generated with probability 0.25, that is, each state was
produced 7.5 × 105 times in the random sequence. The
total number of post-selected pairs for each block was
comprised between 1.3 × 105 and 2.6 × 105 depending
on the value of µ and for a detection efficiency of 25%.
Errors on the correctness parameters were estimated by
propagating the Poisson errors of the click counting.
Theoretical models for c. The correctness parameter
and its evolution with µ can be simulated with a simple
theoretical model taking into account experimental pa-
rameters. This model was used to plot the simulation
curves in Fig. 3. We model the polarization state gen-
erated by the polarization controller as a density matrix
ρ = p|s〉〈s|+ (1− p)12 , where |s〉 is the ideal target state,
with s = 0, 1,+,−, 1 is the identity matrix and p is the
polarized fraction of the light.
This polarization state is associated with a weak co-
herent state |α〉 = e−µ2 ∑∞n=0 αn√n! |n〉 with mean photon
number µ = |α|2. For a threshold single-photon detector
with detection efficiency ηdet and dark count probability
per detection gate Pdc, the click probabilities for ρ can be
expressed as: P (Ds) = Pdc +
(
1− e−µηdet)(1 + p)/2 and
P (Ds¯) = Pdc +
(
1 − e−µηdet)(1 − p)/2, where s = 0/+
and s¯ = 1/− if s = 0,+, and s = 1/− and s¯ = 0/+
if s = 1,−. If instead, we consider true single-photon
states, with an emission efficiency µ, the click proba-
bilities for ρ are: P (Ds) = Pdc + µηdet(1 + p)/2 and
P (Ds¯) = Pdc + µηdet(1− p)/2.
In both cases, the state correctness, post-selected on
events with at least one click, can be expressed as: cs =
P (Ds)
(
1−P (Ds¯)
)
1−
(
1−P (Ds)
)(
1−P (Ds¯)
) .
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